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Bill Dixon  
 
 
Phillips v Scotdale Pty Ltd1  
 
In this decision the Court of Appeal considered the operation of a special 
condition of an REIQ contract for the purchase of a parcel of residential land 
under which the deposit holder was to pay the deposit to the seller immediately 
and without any breach of contract by the purchaser.  The special condition also 
expressly provided that the deposit was to be repayable to the purchaser in the 
event of breach by the seller. 
 
The issues for the court were whether the operation of the special condition 
created an instalment sale contract for the purposes of the Property Law Act 
1974 (Qld) (such that the seller would not be entitled to terminate the contract 
without first giving the notice contemplated by s 72(1)), and further, whether ss 
384 and 385 of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) (‗PAMDA‘) 
operated to invalidate the payment contemplated by the special condition. 
 
Instalment Contract Issue 
 
Statutory provisions 
 
Section 71 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) defines an instalment contract as 
an executory contract for the sale of land in terms of which the purchaser is 
bound to make a payment or payments (other than a deposit) without becoming 
entitled to receive a conveyance in exchange for the payment or payments. 
 
Section 71 defines a deposit to mean a sum –  
(a) not exceeding 10% of the purchase price payable under an instalment 
contract; and 
(b) paid or payable in 1 or more amounts; and 
(c) liable to be forfeited and retained by the vendor in the event of a 
breach of contract by the purchaser 
 
Contractual provisions 
Special condition 1 of the contract, as varied, provided: 
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 ‗Despite any other clause contained in this Contract (including the Terms of Contract) 
the parties agree the Purchase Price of $3,500,000.00 is to be paid to the Seller as 
follows: 
 (a)  $100,000.00 by way of part deposit payable as set out in the Reference Schedule; 
and 
 (b)  $100,000.00 by way of further part deposit payable on 4 September 2007 to be 
released immediately to the Sellers (and for the purposes of clarity the parties agree 
that Special Condition 13 shall also apply to this further part deposit); and 
 (c)  $800,000.00 on the Settlement Date; and 
 (d)  $2,500,000.00 (Balance Price) on or before 17 July 2008 … ‗ 
Special condition 13 of the contract contemplated that when the purchaser had 
paid the total amount of the deposit, ie $200,000 to the deposit holder, that sum 
would be paid over to the vendors forthwith. The special condition provided: 
 ‗The parties mutually acknowledge, authorise and agree that as soon as practicable 
after the payment of the balance deposit the deposit holder shall pay to the Seller the 
Deposit (less the agents commission and any GST payable on that commission which 
sums shall be retained in the Agent's Trust Account pending settlement or earlier 
termination of the contract) and the Buyers shall have no claim against the Sellers 
(provided the Sellers are not in breach of the provisions hereof) or the deposit holder 
except where the Seller is in breach of its obligations under this Contract in which case 
nothing will prevent the Buyer from recovering from the Seller any amounts entitled to it 
under this Contract or at law.‘ 
Argument 
 
The purchaser argued that the money described in special condition 13 as the 
‗the deposit‘ was not a deposit as defined in s 71 as this money was not ‗liable to 
be forfeited and retained by the vendor in the event of a breach of contract by the 
purchaser‘.  Rather, it was argued, that special condition 13 entitled the seller to 
be paid this money immediately, without waiting to see if the purchaser did 
breach the contract. 
 
This argument was resisted by the seller on the basis that special condition 13 
did not effect an immediate forfeiture.  Rather, the seller could only forfeit and 
retain this money in accordance with special condition 13 if the seller themselves 
were not in breach of the contract. 
 
Decision 
 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the conclusion of the trial judge that nothing in 
the s 71 definition of ‗deposit‘ suggested that the sum deposited must be kept as 
a separate fund pending completion of the contract or that it could not be paid to 
the seller to be held by the seller prior to completion. 
 
In holding that the money paid fell within the statutory definition of a ‗deposit‘, the 
Court of Appeal considered that the purchaser‘s argument ignored the 
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contractual right of the purchaser to recover the money from the seller if the 
seller failed to meet their contractual obligations to complete.  Under special 
condition 13 the purchaser would be entitled to sue the seller to recover the 
money paid if the seller breached the contract. 
 
As noted by Keane JA (with the agreement of de Jersey CJ and White J):  
 
The existence of such an entitlement in the purchaser is inconsistent with the proposition that 
the purchaser had once and for all lost all entitlement to that sum when it was paid to the 
vendors under special condition 13: the purchaser's right to recover this sum from the 
vendors, even if it be properly described as contingent, was not to be finally extinguished 
before the termination of the contract. Indeed, it is at least arguable that special condition 13 
meant that it would be extinguished, even upon breach by the purchaser, only if the vendors 
were not themselves in breach of contract. 
Whatever the shades of meaning of "forfeiture" or "liability to forfeiture" under the general law 
or in other statutory contexts, there can be no doubt that, when s 71 of the PLA speaks of the 
sum in question being "liable to be forfeited and retained by the vendor", the liability referred 
to is a liability to the loss of the sum which is final and absolute, not provisional or defeasible. 
One must give force to the words "and retained by the vendor" in para (c) of the definition of 
"deposit". These words confirm that the liability to forfeiture there referred to is a liability in 
the purchaser to lose the sum finally and absolutely to the vendor. Special condition 13 did 
not operate of its own terms finally and absolutely to extinguish the purchaser's entitlement to 
the moneys payable by the purchaser under special condition 1. That loss of entitlement 
could only occur upon the occurrence of subsequent events, one of which was breach of the 
contract by the purchaser.
2
 
 
As the money in question was held to be a deposit within the meaning of s 71, 
the contract between the parties was not an instalment contract and the seller 
was justified in terminating the contract without first giving a notice of the type 
contemplated by s 72(1) of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). 
 
Illegality Issue 
 
PAMDA provisions 
 378  Application  
o (1)  Sections 379 and 380 apply if an amount is received by a 
licensee—  
 (a)  for a transaction; or 
 (b)  with a written direction for its use.  
Example of paragraph (b)— 
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an amount received by a real estate agent with a written 
direction to use it for advertising or marketing by the 
agent or another person 
o (2)  In this section—  
amount, received by a licensee for a transaction— 
 (a)  includes deposit and purchase monies for the  
transaction; but 
 (b)  does not include an amount payable to the licensee in 
relation to the transaction in refund of an expense the 
licensee was authorised to incur and did incur and for 
which the licensee holds a receipt. 
 
 379  Dealing with amount on receipt  
A licensee must, immediately on receiving the amount— 
o (a)  pay it to the licensee's general trust account; or 
o (b)  if section 380(1) applies, invest it under section 380(2). 
Example of paragraph (a)– 
A licensee who collects an amount of rent for a property owner must 
pay the amount to the licensee's general trust account before the 
money can be paid to the owner. 
Maximum penalty–200 penalty units or 3 years imprisonment. 
… 
 384  When payments may be made from trust accounts  
o (1)  An amount paid to a trust account must be kept in the 
account until it is paid out under this Act.  
Maximum penalty–200 penalty units or 3 years imprisonment. 
o (2)  An amount may be paid from a trust account only in a way 
permitted under this Act.  
Maximum penalty–200 penalty units or 3 years imprisonment. 
 5 
 
 385  Permitted drawings from trust accounts  
o (1)  A licensee may draw an amount from the licensee's trust 
account to pay the licensee's transaction fee or transaction 
expenses in relation to a transaction only if—  
 (a)  the amount is drawn against the transaction fund for 
the transaction; and 
 (b)  the licensee is authorised to draw the amount under 
this section. 
Maximum penalty–200 penalty units or 3 years imprisonment. 
o (2)  The licensee is authorised—  
 (a)  to draw an amount from the transaction fund to pay a 
transaction expense when the expense becomes 
payable; and 
 (b)  when the transaction is finalised, to draw an amount 
from the transaction fund that is equal to the difference 
between—  
 (i)  the balance of the transaction fund; and 
 (ii)  the total of the licensee's transaction fee and 
any outstanding transaction expense; 
to pay the person entitled to the amount or in accordance 
with the person's written direction; and 
Example of when transaction is finalised— 
the settlement of a contract for the sale of property or the 
termination of the contract 
 (c)  to draw the licensee's transaction fee from the 
transaction fund when the amount, if any, mentioned in 
paragraph (b) has been paid and when the transaction is 
finalised. 
o (3)  For subsection (2)(b) or (c), if a dispute about the transaction 
fund arises, the transaction is not taken to be finalised until the 
licensee is authorised to pay out the transaction fund under 
section 388. 
o (4)  The licensee must pay an amount mentioned in subsection 
(2)(b) to the person entitled to it or in accordance with the 
person's written direction—  
 (a)  if the person asks, in writing, for the balance-within 14 
days after receiving the request; or 
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 (b)  if the person has not asked, in writing, for the balance-
within 42 days after the person first had the right to the 
balance. 
Maximum penalty–200 penalty units or 3 years imprisonment. 
o (5)  In this section—  
transaction expenses means the expenses the licensee is 
authorised to incur in connection with the performance of the 
licensee's activities for a transaction. 
transaction fee means the fees, charges and commission 
payable for the performance of the licensee's activities for a 
transaction. 
transaction fund means the amount held in a licensee's trust 
account for the transaction. 
 
Argument 
 
The seller argued to the extent that special condition 13 allowed the seller to be 
paid the money before the contract was finalised, it was void for illegality by 
virtue of the provisions of the PAMDA. 
 
Comments of the Court of Appeal 
 
The learned trial judge concluded that s 384 and s 385(2)(b) precluded the 
contractual provision operating in the manner contemplated as these statutory 
provisions only permitted the disbursement of the deposit money held by the 
agent when the transaction was finalised. 
 
Although not strictly necessary to determine (given the finding on the instalment 
contract issue), the Court of Appeal disagreed.  In opining, the Court of Appeal 
considered that the critical issue was whether PAMDA manifested an intention 
that the parties to the transaction may not lawfully authorise a licensee to pay 
moneys out of trust to one of them before the transaction is finalised.  In this 
regard, it was noted as a matter of principle that the fundamental common law 
freedom of competent parties to contract as they please will not be regarded as 
having been denied by legislation unless that legislative intention is clearly 
stated. The Court of Appeal opined that there were two (2) approaches to the 
analysis of the relevant provisions of the PAMDA which demonstrated that the 
legislature did not intend such an outcome. 
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First, s 378(1) expressly contemplated that an amount of money may be received 
by a licensee, either ‗for a transaction‘ or ‗with a written direction for its use‘.  To 
the extent that s 385(2)(b) operates upon the assumption that the transaction for 
which the deposit has been paid has been finalised, it is limited in application to 
circumstances where the deposit has been received for a transaction and has no 
application where the deposit is received with a written direction for its use.  On 
the facts present, special condition 13 could be viewed as a written direction to 
the licensee by all the parties with any beneficial entitlement to the deposit 
money meaning that the money received was received with a written direction for 
its use rather than money received for a transaction.  In complying with such a 
written direction, the licensee would simply be complying with an obligation which 
takes its legal force from the general law of agency. 
 
Under an alternative second approach to the effect of these provisions of the 
PAMDA, the ‗transaction‘ for which the money in question was paid could be 
viewed to be finalised if the transaction was the disposal of the money paid to the 
licensee as it could be argued that the entitlement to the money was resolved by 
special condition 13 at least on the assumption that special condition 13 made an 
immediate, final and absolute disposition of the entitlement to the money held by 
the licensee to the seller. 
 
Comment 
 
The possibility of an inadvertent creation of an instalment contract is a constant 
risk in conveyancing practice.  The decision of the Court of Appeal serves to 
highlight the significance of careful drafting.  In this regard, the provision in the 
special condition that expressly provided for the deposit to be repayable to the 
purchaser in the event of breach by the seller proved to be critical. 
 
The dicta observations by the Court of Appeal concerning the operation of the 
PAMDA provisions regulating the ability of a licensee to release deposit money 
are also of considerable interest.  Where, as in this instance, it was the wish of 
the contractual parties for the deposit, or some part thereof, to be released by the 
licensee prior to settlement prudence may dictate that the contract expressly 
provide that the amount is received by the licensee with a written direction for its 
use as provided for by s 378(1)(b) of the PAMDA rather than being an amount 
received for a transaction of the type contemplated by s 378(1)(a) of the PAMDA. 
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Bennett v Stewart3  
 
The Bennetts signed a standard REIQ contract as buyers of the Stewarts‘ house 
and land.  However, the reference schedule to the contract document contained 
these words next to the word ‗buyer‘: 
 
 ‗Bennett Superannuation Fund‘ 
 
The Bennetts wished to enforce the contract. 
 
In response, the Stewarts (the sellers) raised two issues: 
 
 As the ‗Bennett Superannuation Fund‘ was a trust and not a distinct legal 
entity capable of making a contract, the contract did not specify who was 
the buyer, so that the contract was void for uncertainty; and 
 The contract was unenforceable as there was no sufficient note or 
memorandum for the purposes of s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) 
as s 59 requires, amongst other things, an identification of the parties. 
 
McMurdo J did not accept either of these arguments and made an order for 
specific performance in favour of the Bennetts.  Looking at each issue 
separately: 
 
Uncertainty 
 
McMurdo J opined that the document as a whole must be considered, and within 
proper bounds, some interpretation must be sought to give the document the 
legal effect which it clearly was intended to have.  In this regard, the signature of 
the Bennetts above the word ‗buyer‘ provided a strong indication that the 
Bennetts were indeed the buyers.  This was considered consistent with the 
reference to the Superannuation Fund in the schedule in that any acquisition of 
what would be an asset of the trust would be made by the Fund‘s trustees.  
McMurdo J opined: 
 
 ‗It is the fact that plainly the specified buyer in the schedule is not a distinct legal entity, 
but is a reference to a trust relationship, which indicates that when the Bennetts signed 
as the buyers, that is what they were.‘
4
 
 
McMurdo J also accepted that there could be another rational explanation for the 
Bennett‘s signatures i.e. they were signing the contract as trustees of the 
Superannuation fund.  On this alternative view, the contract was still considered 
to be sufficiently certain as the case law made it clear that for the purpose of 
contractual certainty, a party although unnamed, may be sufficiently described in 
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other ways.  Accordingly, if the document was to be interpreted as a contract 
made by the trustees of the fund, extrinsic evidence could be received to identify 
the relevant trustees.  In this case, there was unchallenged evidence that the 
Bennetts were and remained the trustees of the specified trust. 
 
Section 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) 
 
As was the case for the purpose of contractual certainty, to satisfy s 59 of the 
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), McMurdo J held that a party, although unnamed, 
may be sufficiently described in other ways.  Accordingly, the Bennetts as 
trustees were sufficiently identified by the contract for the purposes of s 59. 
 
For the Stewarts it was argued that the contract did not describe a person or 
entity which could, with evidence, be identified; rather it described the buyer as 
something which had no legal existence for which therefore there could be no 
exercise of identification.  This argument was not accepted by McMurdo J on the 
basis that the submission only looked to the one line in the reference schedule 
and did not consider the effect of the other parts of the contract.  Nor was it 
considered to be an argument which sought to find some rational interpretation 
which would give the document the legal force which those signing it meant it to 
have. 
 
Comment 
 
Although some practitioners may be surprised by the result in this instance, the 
reasoning may be seen to be consistent with a substantial body of earlier case 
law.  When it comes to the interpretation of a contract, courts will do their utmost 
to find a find a rational interpretation which will give the contract certainty when it 
is clear that the parties intended the document to have contractual effect. 
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Black v Garnock5 
 
What was previously established as a fundamental principle, that a judgment 
creditor may take no interest beyond what the judgment debtor could give, was 
called into question by this decision of the High Court. 
 
Facts 
The Garnocks and the Luffs, as purchasers, entered a contract to purchase a 
rural property from Mrs Smith with settlement due on 24 August 2005.  On 23 
August 2005, a creditor obtained a writ against Mrs Smith from the District Court 
of New South Wales.  
No caveat was lodged on behalf of the purchasers prior to settlement (there 
being no equivalent, in New South Wales, of the Queensland settlement notice 
mechanism). 
 
On the day of settlement: 
 the purchasers' solicitors conducted a check search of the title at 
8.55 am (which revealed nothing adverse to the purchasers‘ 
interest);  
 some time between 9.20 am and 9.30 am, certain discussions took 
place between the solicitors for the creditor and the solicitors for the 
purchasers.  While the solicitors for the creditor indicated their 
intention to ―stop the sale‖ they did not indicate their intention to 
register the writ; 
 the writ, obtained the day before, was recorded at 11.53 am; and  
 settlement took place at 2.00 pm. 
When the purchasers attempted to register their transfer they were advised that 
the New South Wales Registrar General would not register the transfer because 
of the prior registration of the writ. 
In adopting this stance, the Registrar General relied on s 105A(2) of the Real 
Property Act 1900 (NSW) that prohibits the Registrar-General from registering, 
during the six month "protected period", a dealing that affected land subject to a 
writ of execution.  In a 3-2 decision, the High Court upheld the correctness of this 
approach and thereby upheld the interest of the judgment creditor under the writ 
of execution against the earlier unregistered equitable interest of the purchasers 
from the judgment debtor.  In particular, the majority held that a subsequent sale 
of the property during the six month protected period by the sheriff acting under 
the writ would defeat the earlier equitable interest of the purchasers.  The 
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majority considered this result to be consistent with s 105B(2) of the Real 
Property Act 1900 (NSW) which provides, in part, that the effect of the 
registration of a transfer from the Sheriff is that the purchaser from the Sheriff 
holds the land transferred free from all estates and interests except such as are 
recorded in the relevant folio of the Register or on the relevant registered dealing. 
 
The judges in the majority were Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ with Gleeson 
CJ and Crennan J dissenting.  In their joint judgment, Gummow and Hayne JJ 
were prepared to discount the purchasers‘ unregistered interest in the land in 
circumstances where that equitable interest had not been protected by the 
lodgement of a caveat prior to the lodgement of the writ of execution.  In their 
view, the bare fact that the purchasers made their contract of sale with the 
judgment debtor before the writ was recorded did not constitute sufficient reason 
to intercept the operation of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW).  Significantly, the 
other majority judge, Callinan J expressly disapproved (at [87] to [89]) of the 
approach evinced in Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v Austral Lighting 
Pty Ltd6, namely that an equity created prior to lodgement of a writ of execution 
may be set up until a transfer from the Sheriff has been registered. 
 
Although the provisions of the New South Wales legislation under consideration 
by the High Court do not exactly mirror the provisions in the Land Title Act 1994 
(Qld), the decision of the High Court may be considered significant to the extent 
that the approach of the majority judges is inconsistent with the principle that a 
judgment creditor may take no interest beyond what the judgment debtor could 
give at the time of lodgement of the writ of execution. 
 
Against this background, it is useful to consider how similar factual 
circumstances to those prevailing in Black v Garnock7 may be dealt with in terms 
of Queensland Titles Office practice.  In order to consider this matter further, the 
impact of standard contractual provisions must also be considered. 
 
Background – Impact of Standard Contractual Provisions 
 
If a check search of the title is conducted on the day of settlement and an 
enforcement warrant affecting the property is discovered, under the standard 
REIQ contract the Seller will be in breach of warranty (namely that at settlement 
there will be no unsatisfied judgment, order or writ affecting the property).  The 
discovery of the writ upon a check search being conducted will trigger a right in 
the purchaser to terminate the contract by notice to the Seller.   
 
Unless the purchaser or the purchaser‘s representative fail to conduct a check 
search of the title on the day of settlement, any potential difficulties arising from 
the lodgement of a form 12 Request to Register Writ/Warrant of Execution with 
office copy of the writ of execution (subsequently referred to as a ‗form 12‘) 
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should be confined to circumstances where the form 12 is lodged after the check 
search is conducted but before registration of the transfer to the purchaser.   
 
At least four (4) different scenarios may be formulated: 
 
Lodgement of Transfer precedes Lodgement of Form 12 
 
1. A transfer from a judgment debtor is lodged, but is unregistered, when a form 
12 is lodged. 
 
In these circumstances, by virtue of s 117 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) the 
purchaser is not bound by the writ of execution until it is registered, whether or 
not there is actual or constructive notice of the writ.  As the transfer has priority it 
will be registered.  The writ of execution will not be capable of registration as the 
registered owner of the lot will no longer be the judgment debtor.  Accordingly, 
the form 12 will be requisitioned to be withdrawn. 
 
Lodgement of Form 12 precedes Lodgement of Transfer 
 
2. A form 12 is lodged and registered after the check search but before the 
lodgement of a transfer to a purchaser from the judgment debtor.  The purchaser 
has not deposited a settlement notice nor has the purchaser lodged a caveat. 
 
In these circumstances, if the approach evinced in Black v Garnock [2007] HCA 
31 (in similar factual circumstances) is followed in Queensland the form 12 will 
have priority.  However, it must be noted that the decision of the High Court was 
concerned with the impact of particular statutory provisions and the particular 
mischief that these New South Wales statutory provisions were designed to 
remedy.  In light of existing Queensland authority dealing with the impact of 
statutory provisions largely comparable to those presently contained in the Land 
Title Act 1994 it would seem to be arguable that the purchaser‘s equity created 
prior to the lodgement of the form 12 may be set up until any transfer from the 
Sheriff has been registered.  This issue must await final determination in 
Queensland. 
 
It should be noted that in the case where the transfer was pursuant to the 
exercise of a power of sale under a prior registered mortgage, s 120A of the 
Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) makes it clear that the registration of the writ does not 
prevent registration of the transfer and on registration of the transfer, the registrar 
must cancel registration of the writ of execution. 
 
With settlement notice deposited prior to settlement 
 
3. A settlement notice is deposited (referring to the interest of the transferee from 
the judgment debtor), then a form 12 is lodged after the check search but before 
the lodgement of the transfer to the purchaser from the judgment debtor. 
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In these circumstances, the Queensland Titles Office takes the view that the 
effect of the settlement notice deposited before the form 12 is lodged is to 
prevent registration of the form 12.  If this view is correct, there is no impediment 
to the registration of the transfer to the purchaser from the judgment debtor. 
 
With caveat lodged prior to settlement 
 
4. A caveat is lodged (notifying the equitable interest of the purchaser from the 
judgment debtor), then a form 12 is lodged after the check search but before the 
lodgement of the transfer to the purchaser from the judgment debtor. 
 
In these circumstances, the Queensland Titles Office takes the view that the 
effect of the caveat notified on the title before the form 12 is lodged is to prevent 
registration of the form 12 (unless the caveator specifies in the caveat that it is 
not to apply to a form 12).  If this view is correct, there is no impediment to the 
registration of the transfer to the purchaser from the judgment debtor. 
 
Comment 
 
In summary, if the view adopted by the Queensland Titles Office in scenarios 3 
and 4 is correct, it would appear that any difficulties that Black v Garnock [2007] 
HCA 31 may raise as to the correct interpretation of the Queensland legislation 
may be restricted, at least in the conveyancing context, to circumstances where 
the purchaser or the purchaser‘s representative fails to either conduct a check 
search on the day of settlement or fails to protect its unregistered interest by way 
of a caveat or a settlement notice deposited before the settlement date.  Given 
the provisions of the Conveyancing Protocol, it would be expected that these 
circumstances will arise infrequently. 
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Jones v Knobel & Davis Property Services Pty Ltd8  
 
In this decision the Queensland Court of Appeal considered whether a real estate 
agent was prevented by s140 of the PAMDA from recovering a commission 
where the agent only obtained a written appointment in the approved statutory 
form (form 22a) after having commenced to act as a real estate agent. 
Facts 
On 24 May 2004, a licensed real estate agent met with a land owner who told the 
agent that she had received an offer to purchase her land and gave the agent 7 
days to obtain a better offer.  
 
On 27 May 2004, the agent organised a meeting between himself, the land 
owner and a property developer who was interested in buying the land.  At this 
meeting there was discussion of the property developer buying the land and the 
land owner buying a unit in one of property developer‘s developments.  The next 
day the parties entered a Heads of Agreement recording the consensus which 
had then been reached however it was not contended that this document was 
legally binding. 
 
On 2 June 2004, the land owner signed a form 22a appointing the agent.  Item 
4.1 of the form 22a specified that the service to be performed by the agent was 
the ‗Sale of Land and Buildings‘.  The form then provided that the method of 
performance of this service was ‗Sale by Private Treaty and negotiations with 
qualified buyers.‘  Later that day, the landowner signed the contract prepared by 
the agent for the sale of the land to a company under the control of the property 
developer. 
 
After the land owner refused to pay, the agent successfully brought proceedings 
in the District Court to recover commission.  In finding for the agent, the trial 
judge held that the only activity that gave rise to the right of commission was the 
final entry into a contract of sale. 
PAMDA Requirements 
Section 133(1)(a) of the PAMDA provides that a real estate agent who is asked 
by a client to perform an activity (‗service‘) for the client must not act for the client 
unless the client first appoints the real estate agent in writing.  Further, s 140(1) 
provides that an agent cannot sue for, or recover or retain a commission unless, 
at the time the activity was performed, the person held a real estate agent's 
licence, was authorised under the person's licence to perform the activity and 
had been properly appointed. 
                                                 
8
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Argument  
For the land owner it was argued that the agent acted as a real estate agent prior 
to his appointment being signed on 2 June 2004.  It was further argued that a 
broad interpretation of the statutory term 'activity' (broader than the mere signing 
of the contract of sale) would be consistent with the consumer protection 
objectives of the PAMDA. 
Decision 
The Court of Appeal found that the agent was entitled to the commission 
claimed.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal held that s 133 and s 
140 had different roles.  To recover commission, as specified in the form 22a, the 
activity to be performed and the activity for which the agent was retained was the 
future activity of selling the land and building.  It was this future activity which 
sourced the entitlement to commission.  Adopting this view, the service for which 
the agent was appointed was performed and an entitlement to commission arose 
on 2 June 2004, conditional upon settlement being effected.  As the agent had 
been properly appointed at the time this specific activity was performed, the 
agent was entitled to commission.  However, as noted by the Court of Appeal, 
the agent may be in breach of s 133 for performing certain services without first 
being duly appointed.  While a breach of s 133 would mean that the agent had 
committed an offence, was liable to pay a penalty and may be subjected to 
disciplinary proceedings, the agent‘s entitlement to commission was not lost 
simply because the agent‘s appointment to sell the property became effective 
subsequent to other activity in respect of that property for which there was no 
appointment. 
 
Comment 
 
Where an agent defines the service to be performed in the appointment 
document as the future activity of having a contract signed by a purchaser, the 
Court of Appeal‘s decision indicates that provided the appointment document is 
signed before the contract is signed there will be no restriction on the agent‘s 
right to recover commission under s 140 notwithstanding a potential breach of s 
133 due to the agent having commenced to act as a real estate agent prior to the 
written appointment.   
 
The question may be raised whether this result is consistent with the consumer 
protection imperatives of the PAMDA and the need to ensure that a prospective 
client is fully aware of the statutory protections afforded by the PAMDA.  The 
observation has been made elsewhere that the decision ‗shifts the agent‘s focus 
from disclosing important rights of the consumer to satisfying a condition 
precedent to payment‘.9 
                                                 
9
 Kris Byrne, ‘Proper Appointment and Commission: Advantage Agents’ (2008) 29 Qld Lawyer 
(forthcoming). 
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Todrell Pty Ltd v Finch10 
 
The statutory requirement of formality associated with contracts concerning land 
arises from s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) which provides: 
 
 No action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of land or 
any interest in land unless the contract upon which such action is brought, or some 
memorandum or note of the contract, is in writing, and signed by the party to be charged, 
or by some person by the party lawfully authorised. 
 
In addition to the possibility of a formal contract, the statutory wording clearly 
contemplates reliance on an informal note or memorandum.  To constitute a 
sufficient note or memorandum for the purposes of the statute, the signed note or 
memorandum must contain details of the parties to the contract, an adequate 
description of the property, the price and any other essential terms.11  It is also 
accepted that the doctrine of joinder may be invoked in circumstances where the 
document signed by the party to be charged contains an express or implied 
reference to any other document.  In this way, a sufficient note or memorandum 
may be constituted by the joinder of a number of documents.12 
 
An issue that may arise is whether, for the purposes of joinder, it is possible for 
an earlier document, signed by the party to be charged, to contain an implied 
reference to a transaction evidenced by a later unsigned document.  Joinder was 
not allowed on this basis by Chesterman J of the Supreme Court of Queensland 
in Todrell Pty Ltd v Finch13. 
 
Facts 
 
Owners of land ripe for development were in negotiations to sell the land to two 
property developers.  After a meeting with the first developer, where it was found 
that contractual terms were orally agreed, a deposit cheque was made out and 
given to the owners in return for a receipt.  The owners then changed their minds 
and later signed a binding contract with the second developer.  Given their 
change of mind, the owners refused to sign the formal contract documentation 
that had been signed by the first developer and was submitted by the solicitor for 
the first developer some 10 days after the oral agreement had been reached. 
 
It was common ground that the receipt issued to the first developer was not a 
sufficient memorandum to permit enforcement of the oral agreement as it did not 
adequately identify the parties, the price and one other essential term, being the 
provision of a personal guarantee by a director of the purchasing entity.  
                                                 
10
 [2007] QSC 363. 
11
 SA Christensen, WM Dixon, WD Duncan and SE Jones, Land Contracts in Queensland, 2
nd
 ed, 
Federation Press, 2007, 115-116. 
12
 Ibid 116-118. 
13
 [2007] QSC 363. 
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However, the receipt did clearly acknowledge that the deposit was paid in the 
context of a land sale transaction.  One of the issues for the court was whether 
this reference impliedly permitted joinder to the formal contract documentation 
that had been submitted by the solicitor for the first developer which the owners 
refused to sign.  There was no doubt that the later formal contract documentation 
contained all the terms as earlier orally agreed. 
 
The difficulty for the court was that the formal contract documentation did not 
exist when the receipt was signed meaning that the owners did not know what 
they contained.  In finding that joinder was not permissible in these 
circumstances, the court accepted that, except in the case of contemporaneity, 
the document which is to be connected to, and read with, the signed document, 
to create a sufficient memorandum, must exist at the time of signature so it can 
be a document capable of being referred to by the signed document.14 
 
Comment 
 
The requirements for a sufficient note or memorandum to satisfy the writing 
requirement imposed by s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) assume 
considerable importance where a formal contract is not signed, for whatever 
reason.  While the doctrine of joinder may render assistance in satisfying these 
requirements, the limitations of the doctrine are well illustrated by the outcome of 
this litigation.  
                                                 
14
 Ibid at [103]. 
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Other decisions 
 
In addition to the cases highlighted, the decisions briefly mentioned below will be 
of interest to practitioners concerned with conveyancing. 
 
Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) 
 
Juniper v Roberts Pty Ltd15  
 
A contract for the sale of residential property with a 2 year settlement date 
allowed the purchaser to take early possession.  The purchaser exercised this 
right and also leased the property, carried out some renovation work, removed 
some fixture and fittings and advertised the property for sale.  Shortly before 
settlement was due, the purchaser gave notice of termination of the contract on 
the basis of the seller‘s failure to attach a warning statement in the manner 
prescribed by s 366 of the PAMDA (in its form prior to the December 2005 
amendments).  On the facts, Douglas J held that there was a prima facie case of 
breach of s 366 entitling the purchaser to terminate at any time before 
settlement. 
 
For the seller, it was argued that the purchaser waived his right to terminate the 
contract or elected not to exercise that right by proceeding with the contract.  
Following the decision of Muir J in MP Management (Aust) Pty Ltd v Churven,16 
Douglas J held that the statutory right to terminate was unqualified, irrespective 
of the nature and extent of the performance under the contract and irrespective 
of the party‘s conduct by reference to it.  In proceeding with the contract until 
close to the date for settlement, the purchaser did not forego the statutory right to 
terminate at any time before settlement.  A further submission that the purchaser 
was estopped by his conduct from relying on the right to terminate was also 
unsuccessful. 
 
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) 
 
Lee v Surfers Paradise Beach Resort Pty Ltd17 
 
Where the contract has not been settled, s 214 of the Body Corporate and 
Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) requires a seller to give a further 
statement to rectify any inaccuracies in the initial disclosure statement required 
by s 213 in relation to proposed lots.  In this decision, a majority of the Court of 
Appeal held that a further statement under s 214 should be provided once the 
identity of the proposed caretaking and letting agent, the dates between which 
the agreement was to run, the lot number of the resident caretaker‘s unit and the 
                                                 
15
 [2007] QSC 379. 
16
 [2002] QSC 320. 
17
 [2008] QCA 29. 
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parts of the common property to be occupied by the resident caretaker were 
available to the seller as the initial disclosure statement was no longer accurate.  
However, a right of termination only arises where a buyer is materially prejudiced 
due to the inaccuracies, a fact which was not established according to the 
majority on this issue. 
 
Menniti v Winn18 
 
This decision of the Court of Appeal concerned the construction of s 206 of the 
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) being the 
requirement for the seller of an existing lot in a community title scheme to provide 
a disclosure statement to the proposed buyer of the lot.  Due to the seller having 
retained ownership of all of the lots in the relevant scheme, the affairs of the body 
corporate had been run in an informal manner and the requirements of the Act 
had not been complied with.  There was no administrative fund or sinking fund 
and no annual contributions had been set.  As a result, the seller completed 
many parts of the disclosure statement with the words ‗not applicable‘ or ‗nil‘. 
 
For the buyer, it was argued that the buyer‘s termination of the contract was 
authorised by the seller‘s substantial non compliance with s 206(2) of the Act.  
The buyer sought to argue that the disclosure statement must be completed, not 
by reference to the true facts, but by reference to what the facts would have been 
had the affairs of the body corporate been properly administered.  This argument 
was dismissed.  The information provided in the disclosure statement was 
accurate and in compliance with the statutory requirements.   
 
Land Sales Act 1984 (Qld) 
 
Three Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for Savoire Faire Community Titles 
Scheme 384119 
 
The restriction imposed by s 8 of the Land Sales Act 1984 (Qld) will not prevent a 
person entering a contract for the sale of a proposed allotment where the 
contract is conditional upon the grant of an exemption from the Registrar where 
the land is being subdivided into no more than five (5) allotments.  In these 
circumstances, s 19(7) prescribes that the application for statutory exemption 
must be made within 30 days ‗after the event that marks the entry of a purchaser 
upon the purchase of the proposed allotment.‘   
 
The Court of Appeal held that the effect of this particular statutory wording was 
that the application needed to be made within 30 days of the purchaser signing 
the contract rather than within 30 days of the contract being formed.  As noted by 
de Jersey CJ, the words used in s 19(7) suggested that the legislature was not 
confining itself to the formation of a contract.  Otherwise one would have 
                                                 
18
 [2008] QCA 66. 
19
 [2008] QCA 167. 
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expected an orthodox reference to ‗the formation of the contract‘ or the like.  In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeal also had regard to the definition of 
purchaser in s 6A which provides that a person who signs ‗an instrument that is 
intended to bind the person (absolutely or conditionally) to purchase a proposed 
allotment or a proposed lot shall be taken to have entered upon a purchase of 
the allotment … ‘. 
 
As the necessary application for exemption was not made within 30 days of the 
purchaser signing the contract, the contract was rendered void by virtue of s 
19(8). 
 
Campbell v Turner20 
 
Notwithstanding the restriction imposed by s 8 of the Land Sales Act 1984 (Qld), 
on the facts present in this instance the Court of Appeal held that the purchaser 
could raise an estoppel against the seller on the basis of the expectation created 
by the seller that a proposed allotment would be transferred to the purchaser.  
However, in determining the equitable relief to be granted, the most important 
consideration was the nature of the purchaser‘s expectation encouraged by the 
seller.  The relief granted should not exceed that necessary to require the seller 
to make good the expectation that had been encouraged.  As the purchaser‘s 
expectation was always qualified by a recognition that the proposed subdivision 
may not be completed, the remedy granted was the return of the money paid 
together with accrued interest (including compound interest from the time when 
the proposed subdivision was finally abandoned without notification to the 
purchaser). 
                                                 
20
 [2008] QCA 126. 
